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In this paper we propose a method to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. horizontal merger policy and
apply it to the study of five recent consumer product mergers. We selected the mergers from those
that, from the public record, seemed to be most problematic for the antitrust agencies. Thus we estimate
an upper bound on the likely price effect of completed mergers. Our study employs retail scanner data
and uses familiar panel data program evaluation procedures to measure price changes. Our results
indicate that four of the five mergers resulted in some increases in consumer prices, while the fifth














I.  Introduction 
 
  In the last three decades federal review of proposed mergers has become the 
primary form of U.S. competition policy.  Although it is not widely appreciated, 
thousands of merger requests are filed and allowed to proceed annually and a small 
number are blocked because they might result in higher, anticompetitive consumer prices.  
In this paper we propose a method to evaluate the effectiveness of the government policy 
to block mergers and apply it to the study of five recent consumer product mergers.  The 
basic idea is to study the effect on consumer prices of those consummated mergers that 
would be most expected to result in anticompetitive price increases.  The price increases 
from these mergers provide an upper bound on the price increases that other permitted 
mergers may have produced and a lower bound on the price increases that might 
otherwise have occurred in mergers that were blocked.  We thus provide an indication of 
whether government merger policy may have been too hostile or too acquiescent.  
Although very significant public and private resources are devoted to the 
administrative review of the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers before they are 
approved, there has been surprisingly little evaluation of whether the mergers that have 
been permitted are actually anticompetitive.
1  Absent this information it is impossible to 
determine whether government policies are either too stringent or too restrained, or to 
make rational adjustments to these policies.  The Antitrust Modernization Committee’s 
Final Report to the U.S. President and Congress specifically recommends more 
retrospective analysis of government merger enforcement.
2  More generally, the value 
and effectiveness of antitrust policy itself is the subject of intense debate that must rely 
on very little factual information.  Crandall and Winston (2003), for example, argue that 
antitrust policy has not been beneficial for consumers, while Baker (2003) argues to the 
contrary. 
                                                 
1 See Pautler (2003) and Whinston (2006) for reviews of merger studies and the concern they express 
regarding this issue. 
2See the discussion of  Recommendation 10 of the report, pages 61-63.   4
Our study employs retail scanner data and uses familiar panel data program 
evaluation estimation procedures to measure price increases following five mergers.
3  We 
selected the mergers to study from those that, based on the public record, appeared to be 
the most problematic from the antitrust agencies’ point of view.   Our empirical results 
indicate that four of the five mergers we study resulted in some increases in some 
consumer prices, while the fifth merger had little effect on prices.  The estimated price 
increases might be considered relatively modest, as they are typically between 3% and 
7%.  However, given the large amount of commerce in these industries, the implied 
transfer from consumers to manufacturers is substantial.  While the magnitude of some 
price effects varies with our empirical specification, the conclusion that consumer prices 
did not decrease, and most likely increased, was not altered when we changed the way we 
measured consumer prices or the control group, or when we changed the choice of the 
window of time surrounding the merger during which price changes might be 
implemented. 
Our results have several limitations, and thus it would be premature to conclude 
either that the mergers we studied were, on net, harmful to consumers or that our 
evaluation is comprehensive.  First, we do not measure the effects of the mergers on 
prices in the longer run when the effects of some efficiency in the operation of the 
merged firms may emerge.  Second, some mergers resulted in the elimination of existing 
products and the creation of new products.  We do not attempt to measure the benefits or 
costs to consumers of changes in product selection.
4  Third, we have restricted our 
analysis to consumer products mergers, which, although they attract much attention, 
constituted a small fraction of mergers in the period we study.  A more complete analysis 
would require a more comprehensive sampling of mergers. 
The structure of the paper is as follows:  Section II provides a brief review of the 
merger review process and the evaluation studies that do exist; Section III sets out the 
selection method for the mergers studied and provides a discussion of the nature of each 
specific merger; Sections IV and V provided detailed descriptions of the scanner price 
                                                 
3 The mergers are Pennzoil’s purchase of Quaker State, Proctor and Gamble’s purchase of Tambrands, 
General Mills purchase of Chex cereal brands, the combination of liquor giants Guiness and Grand 
Metropolitan, and Aurora’s (Mrs. Butterworth) purchase of Log Cabin.   5
data we purchased for this study and the econometric model and control groups used for 
the evaluation; while Section VI reports the main empirical results, and Section VII 
provides some concluding comments. 
 
II. Government Review of Mergers and Evidence on Its Effectiveness 
  As Table 1 indicates, from 1991 through 2004 37,201 mergers or acquisitions 
were filed with the U.S. government.  As a result of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, 
these mergers must be reviewed by either the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ).  Approximately 97% of these 
mergers were reviewed and allowed to proceed without a full investigation by either of 
the antitrust agencies.  Presumably the agencies decided that in these cases the likely 
effects of these mergers on consumer prices would be small.  Still, 3% of mergers were 
investigated more carefully, and roughly 65% of these mergers were modified to satisfy 
government concerns, abandoned, or blocked.
5     
The legislative premise for the passage of the HSR Act in 1976 has been carefully 
articulated by Baer (1997).  In effect, the government had little ability to analyze mergers 
prior to their consummation since the merging parties were under no obligation to 
announce their intent to merge or to delay consummation in time for a government 
investigation. The result was that anticompetitive mergers that did take place led to 
extremely costly government efforts to sue to restore competition.  The “poster child” in 
the debate leading up to the passage of the HSR Act was apparently the case of the 
“United States vs. El Paso Natural Gas,” which required 7 years to litigate and an 
additional 10 years to accomplish the divestiture that the Supreme Court had ordered.  
The costs of litigation thus include both those required to establish the anticompetitive 
effects of the merger and, because a merged company reconstructs itself as a single 
entity, the difficulty the government encounters in reconstituting two viable companies 
after a court ordered breakup.
6  The HSR Act was expected to remedy these problems by 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 For empirical evidence that these issues can be important see Focarelli and Panetta (2003) on the first, and  
Hausman and Leonard (2002) and Berry and Waldfogel (2001) on the second. 
5 The ratio of enforcement actions to second requests can be larger than 100% in a fiscal year (as is the case 
in 2003) because investigations can extend across fiscal years. 
6 In the lexicon of antitrust law this is often called the problem of “unscrambling the eggs.”   6
forcing the merging parties to announce their intention to merge to the government, and 
by requiring the parties to delay their transaction to allow time for investigation. 
  All mergers of significant asset size are governed by the HSR Act, which requires 
the merging parties to file certain basic information describing the transaction with the 
two antitrust agencies splitting jurisdiction in enforcing the antitrust laws: the FTC and 
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ.
7  After the merging parties file their proposed merger, 
the government has thirty days to decide whether to require the parties to submit 
additional information about the merger.  During this time period the government decides 
which agency will investigate the merger, and that agency conducts a preliminary 
investigation to determine if there is a reasonable chance that the merger would violate 
the antitrust laws.  If the merger appears to be problematic, the government issues a 
“second request” to the parties.  This second request is essentially a detailed subpoena 
asking for all documentary information the parties have that may be relevant to 
determining the effects of the merger on the marketplace.
8  The second request would 
typically ask for all documents describing:  competition between market participants, the 
cost and requirements to enter the market, information about the products the merging 
parties view as substitutes, and any claims that a merged company would operate more 
efficiently.  The full investigation typically also consists of an extensive review of 
company documents, depositions of company executives, and interviews with 
competitors, customers, and other third parties whose opinions the government solicits.  
During the investigation the merging parties may also make presentations demonstrating 
why the merger is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects.  After the parties have 
complied with the second request (typically within two or three months, but sometimes 
six months or more), the government has thirty days to decide whether to block the 
transaction, accept some type of remedy (typically a divestiture of assets or modification 
of the transaction), or allow the merger to proceed.
9 
                                                 
7 Following the passage of the HSR act all mergers valued at more than 15 million dollars in assets were 
required to file with the FTC and DOJ.  In February of 2001, the filing threshold was increased 
substantially to transactions valued at more than 50 million dollars, and the threshold was indexed to 
changes in GDP growth.  The change in the filing threshold is responsible for much of the decrease in 
merger filings after 2001. 
8 The FTC’s web site provides an example of a second request on its web site, www.ftc.gov. 
9 In most cases there is a thirty day waiting period in which the government can make its decision to 
challenge the transaction.  However, in cash tender offers or bankruptcy cases the waiting periods are   7
  The DOJ’s and FTC’s 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
10 provide the analytic 
framework used by economists and lawyers to determine if mergers are likely to be 
anticompetitive.  The Guidelines set out five tasks for agency staff to conduct as part of 
the investigation.  The staff must define a product market (the set of close substitutes to 
the merging parties’ products), define a geographic market (the narrowest area in which 
anticompetitive effects could occur, for the nationally distributed branded consumer 
products mergers like those studied here this is typically the entire U.S.), analyze likely 
competitive effects, analyze claims that the merged firms will operate more efficiently 
leading to lower prices, and determine if entry into the market would be likely and 
sufficient to maintain competition.  While agency economists play a role in all parts of 
the investigation, their primary role is in defining product and geographic markets and 
analyzing the potential competitive effects of a merger.
11 
  The Guidelines discuss two types of anticompetitive effects: coordinated effects 
and unilateral effects.
12  The investigation of possible coordinated anticompetitive effects 
focuses on how a specific transaction will increase the likelihood of collusion, either tacit 
or explicit, following the merger.  Stigler’s (1964) early article describing market 
characteristics that facilitate collusion still highlights the key issues.
13 
  The investigation of possible unilateral anticompetitive effects focuses on how a 
merger changes the merged firm's incentives to price its products.  If the merging firms' 
products are close substitutes, then the merged firm will have an incentive to increase the 
price of its products above pre-merger levels because it internalizes some of the 
substitution following the price increase.  The workhorse model used in antitrust analysis 
assumes that the firms sell differentiated products and engage in Bertrand oligopoly price 
competition.
14 Assuming the economist knows the parameters of the demand system, 
information sufficient to calculate own- and cross-price elasticities, it is straightforward 
                                                                                                                                                 
considerably shorter.  The government has fifteen days for the preliminary investigation and ten days 
following the parties complying with the second request. 
10 The Merger Guidelines can be found at www.ftc.gov. 
11 See, e.g., Froeb et al. (2004) for a discussion of the type of work economists do. 
12 These phrases are used to describe concepts that are similar to cooperative and non-cooperative games. 
13 There has been considerable subsequent theoretical work, such as Green and Porter (1994), as well as 
empirical work that is formal, Porter and Zona (1999), and descriptive, Ashenfelter and Graddy (2005).   
Block et al. (1981), Newmark (1988), and Sproul (1993) each have examined a number of collusion cases 
to more generally evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. prosecution of cartels. 
14 See, for example, Deneckere and Davidson (1985).   8
to simulate the price effects of a merger, or to determine what level of efficiencies 
(decreases in marginal cost due to the increased efficiency of the merged firms) are 
required to maintain pre-merger prices.
15  Since the simulation approach focuses entirely 
on price competition and ignores issues of product repositioning and advertising, which 
can be very important in branded consumer products markets, it is our impression that 
many antitrust practitioners take the predictions from merger simulations as upper bounds 
on the likely price effects of a merger.  
While estimating demand systems and using estimated elasticities to simulate the 
price effects of consumer products mergers has been a common component of merger 
analysis for the last decade, there is little direct evidence on how successful these models 
are in predicting price effects.  Nevo (2000) uses demand parameter estimates to study 
the price effects of two mergers in the Ready to Eat (RTE) cereal industry, including the 
General Mills/Ralcorp merger studied here.  Using highly aggregated data and 
assumptions about post-merger efficiency gains, Nevo concludes that his model does a 
good job predicting the price effects of the merger.
16  Pinske and Slade (2004) estimate 
the demand for beer sold on premise in Britain, and then simulate the price effects for 
two mergers (one consummated, one proposed).  While Pinske and Slade find evidence 
supporting their assumption of Bertrand pricing, they do not have the data to determine 
how successful their model is in predicting post-merger pricing. 
Hausman and Leonard (2002) study how the introduction of a new product (a 
novel toilet paper) affected equilibrium prices, and how the observed change in prices 
compared to the simulated price changes generated by different assumed forms of 
competitive behavior.  They find that the observed changes in price following the entry of 
a new product are reasonably close to those predicted by Nash-Bertrand differentiated 
price competition.  While the equilibrium response of firms to a merger may be different 
                                                 
15 Many useful analyses of these models are the subject of confidentiality orders because they were 
produced as a part of on-going litigation.  Published examples that show how these models work include 
Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) and Nevo (2000).  A standard approach is to estimate demand using a 
linear, constant-elasticity model, or a variation of the AIDS model.  Alternatively, an increasingly popular 
method of estimating demand uses the discrete choice model suggested by Berry (1994) and Berry, 
Levinson, and Pakes (1995), which has been applied by Nevo (2000) to a merger simulation. 
 
16 Our results are significantly different from Nevo’s predictions.  See Section VI.   9
than the response to the introduction of a new product, these results provide some of the 
very limited evidence to support the demand estimation/simulation technique. 
  Despite being the major component of antitrust enforcement in the U.S., relatively 
few studies directly estimate the price effects of mergers.  Most existing studies are in 
three historically regulated industries where pricing data are publicly available: airlines, 
banking, and hospitals.
17  The merger evaluation studies most similar to ours in these 
industries include Borenstein’s (1990), Kim and Singal’s (1993), Joskow, Werden, and 
Johnson’s (1994), and Peter’s (2006) studies of airline mergers, Vita and Sacher’s (2001) 
study of a California hospital merger, and Prager and Hannan’s (1998), Focarelli and 
Panetta’s (2003), and Sapienza’s (2002) studies of banking mergers.
18  The other major 
industry where the price effects of mergers have been examined is the petroleum 
industry, see Hastings and Gilbert (2005), Hastings (2004), Taylor and Hosken (2007), 
and Simpson and Taylor (forthcoming).  Finally, Barton and Sherman (1984) studied two 
consummated mergers in the microfilm industry that were subsequently challenged by 
the FTC and McCabe (2002) studied mergers among publishes of academic journals.  All 
but one of these studies finds some evidence of price increases following the mergers 
they study.
19  Focarelli and Panetta also conclude that the anticompetitive effects of the 
mergers they examined were dissipated after three years by large cost savings resulting in 
lower consumer prices. 
  An obvious problem with using any of the previous studies to assess government 
merger policy is that they are case studies selected primarily because of data availability.  
As a result it is impossible to generalize from these studies to determine in what way their 
results reflect the universe of potential mergers.  Our goal has been to select mergers that 
provide at least a minimal basis for generalization.  This is why we selected a group of 
mergers to analyze from (a) the set of branded products mergers that would (b) be 
considered problematic by an outsider observing the market structure of the industries the 
                                                 
17 See Pautler (2003) for an extensive review of this literature. 
18 Prager and Hannan and Focarelli and Panneta study the interest rate consumers earn on deposits.  Thus, 
other things equal, a higher interest rate benefits consumers.  To parallel the discussion of other studies of 
how mergers affect consumer prices, we refer to an interest rate falling as a price increase. 
19 Simpson and Taylor do not find a price increase in their study.  Taylor and Hosken find an increase in 
wholesale gasoline prices that is not passed-thru as an increase in retail prices.  Sapienza finds prices fall in 
regions with small changes in market concentration (suggesting efficiencies dominate), but that large 
changes in concentration are associated with increased prices.   10
merging firms participated in.  We chose branded products to study because of the now 
general availability of scanner price data for these products.  Thus data limitations are no 
longer a primary consideration for selection.  And we chose those mergers most likely to 
be anticompetitive to provide a known contact point with the universe of merging firms 
in the period we study. 
 
III. Mergers Selected for Analysis 
  Our goal was to identify mergers that posed a significant risk of anticompetitive 
harm (so there was a reasonable probability of observing a post-merger price increase) 
but where the risk was not large enough to cause the antitrust agencies to block or 
substantially modify the transaction.  Further, in order to purchase the price and quantity 
data needed to examine the post-acquisition effects of the merger, it was necessary to 
restrict our attention to mergers that occurred between 1997 and 1999.
20  All of the 
mergers we study involve products with significant “brand equity,” which is the phrase 
used to describe the character of products that are imperfect substitutes because of their 
branding.
21  
  We are limited to using public sources in identifying the mergers we study.  
While the antitrust authorities have access to a great deal of private information in 
reviewing mergers (e.g., documents from the merging parties, interviews with market 
participants), this material (and the government’s interpretation of this material) is treated 
as highly confidential and does not typically leave the agencies.  The major exception is 
when the government challenges a merger and a trial takes place in open court.  If the 
government accepts a merger subject to modification (such as the divestiture of some 
assets), then it will publish a very limited description of the competitive issues being 
                                                 
20 The firm that provided our data, Information Resources Incorporated (IRI), only maintains the required 
data in a form readily accessible to be provided at reasonable cost for 5 years.  Because we wanted to have 
at least one year of data pre- and post-merger to analyze the price effects of the merger, given the date at 
which we started this project, it was necessary to restrict our sample to mergers occurring between 1997 
and 1999. 
21 Each of the branded products in our sample sells at a substantial premium to its unbranded competition.  
General Mills Cheerios is, on average, 58% more expensive than its generically similar product.  More 
generally, the branded cereals we study sell for more than 67% than the comparable unbranded cereals.  
The price premiums of the branded products in the other industries we study are similarly large.  Branded 
scotches, vodkas, and gins are roughly 114% more expensive than their unbranded counterparts.  Branded   11
addressed by the government’s action.
22 Alternatively, if the merger is not challenged by 
the government, there is typically no public statement from the government describing 
the transaction.
23  Thus, in general, it is not possible to use information from the 
government’s internal decision making process to determine what mergers it viewed as 
marginal.  Instead researchers are required to use public information, typically press 
reports describing a transaction and measures of market concentration, to determine 
which mergers are likely to be problematic.  In what follows, we describe the method we 
used to identify problematic consummated mergers in consumer products industries. 
To identify potential mergers we first searched the Merger Yearbook, which 
reports mergers by the SIC codes of the merging parties.  We then examined mergers in 
the SIC codes that corresponded to consumer products and identified five consummated 
mergers where the merging parties produced products that were substitutes in markets 
that appeared from press accounts to be somewhat concentrated.  Three of these mergers 
were apparently allowed to be consummated with no government action, Proctor and 
Gamble’s purchase of Tambrands (feminine hygiene products), Aurora Food’s (Mrs. 
Butterworth)  purchase of Kraft’s Log Cabin breakfast syrup business, and Pennzoil’s 
purchase of Quaker State motor oil.  Two of the mergers we selected were modified by 
the FTC, but even with the modifications there still appeared to be a possibility of 
competitive harm from the transaction.  These were General Mills’ purchase of the 
branded cereal business of Ralcorp, and the merger of the distilled spirits businesses of 
Guinness and Grand Metropolitan.  The market shares of the merging parties and 
measures of the level and change in market concentration (HHI and change in HHI) are 
presented in Table 2.
24  The five transactions we study all resulted in highly concentrated 
                                                                                                                                                 
motor oil, breakfast syrups, and feminine hygiene products are 35%, 74%, and 54% more costly, 
respectively, than their corresponding generic products. 
22 This document is typically referred to as an “Aid to Public Comment.” 
23 Recently the agencies have provided some public description of major antitrust investigations reviewed 
by the agencies where no action was taken, e.g., the FTC’s 2002 investigation of mergers in the cruise ship 
industry in or the DOJ’s review of the Whirlpool/Maytag merger in 2006.  
24 The antitrust agencies measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which 
is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of the market participants.  Appendix Table 1 contains a 
list of the market participants and their corresponding market shares used to calculate the HHI’s in Table 2.  
In calculating the HHI, we treat the aggregate private label share as if it were a market participant.  This 
assumption implies that within each store the retailer (who plays the role of the manufacturer in marketing 
a product under its name) is a market participant.  We do not include products listed as “other” in   12
markets (HHI greater than 1800) with changes in market concentration greater than 100 
points.
25  
The level and change in concentration associated with the mergers we examine 
appear to be near the median of mergers examined by the antitrust authorities and less 
than the median of mergers modified by the antitrust authorities.  According to the FTC’s 
report, “Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal Years 1996-2003,” 46% of the 
markets investigated by the FTC had a post-merger level of concentration (HHI) that was 
less than 3000 and 51% of markets had a change in concentration less than 800.
26  As 
shown in Table 2, the mergers we study all have a post-merger HHI less than 3000, and a 
change in HHI between 200 and 1000.  The FTC, however, only took action to modify a 
merger in 25% of the markets it investigated that had a post-merger HHI of less than 
2500 (4 of the 5 transactions we study have a post-merger HHI less than 2500).  
Similarly, the FTC took an enforcement action in 44% of markets that had a change in 
HHI less than 800 and 60% of markets that had a change in HHI of 1200.  While market 
concentration only provides a crude measure of the competitive significance of a 
transaction, on net, this evidence suggests that the transactions we study were similar to 
the marginal mergers examined by the FTC and less competitively significant than the 
typical merger challenged or modified by the FTC. The remainder of this section 
provides some background information about each of the mergers. 
 
Proctor and Gamble/Tambrands 
  The purchase of Tambrands for 1.85 billion dollars in July, 1997 by Proctor and 
Gamble (P&G) gave P&G the leading brand of tampons (Tampax) and sanitary pads 
(Always) in the U.S. At first glance, this merger did not appear likely to have been 
anticompetitive.  Tampons and pads were two different types of feminine hygiene 
products, and many consumers likely felt that the products (while functionally similar) 
                                                                                                                                                 
calculating the HHI.  The other category contains many very small firms that we treat as being a 
competitive fringe in the calculation of HHI.   
25 According to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Section 1.51), “Where the post-merger HHI 
exceeds 1800, it will be presumed that mergers producing an increase in the HHI of 100 points are likely to 
create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.” 
26 Authors’ calculations using information from Table 3.1 of the report.  These data correspond to mergers 
where the merging parties received second requests, where the anticompetitive theory being investigated 
was horizontal (merger of substitutes), and where data was available to estimate market shares.   13
were not close substitutes.  However, both the tampon and pad markets (or a combined 
tampon/pad market) were highly concentrated before the acquisition with only five 
branded firms selling either type of product.
27  Hence, if pads and tampons were 
important substitutes, it would not be surprising to see a price increase post-acquisition.  
In fact, according to press reports, the Department of Justice’s antitrust division did 




  Guinness and Grand Metropolitan merged to become Diageo in a transaction 
valued at approximately 36 billion dollars.
29  This was a conglomerate merger involving 
many consumer businesses, e.g., Pillsbury, Burger King, and the Guinness brewery.  The 
potential antitrust problems resulted from the combination of both firms very large 
portfolios of well known brands of distilled spirits, including Dewars scotch, Johnny 
Walker scotch, J&B scotch, Tanqueray gin, Bombay gin, Smirnoff vodka, Popov vodka, 
Gilbeys gin, Gordon’s gin and vodka, Malibu rum, and Baileys Irish Cream.  In addition 
to owning large portfolios of distilled spirits, the companies also were the sole U.S. 
distributors of many important liquor brands including Stolichnaya vodka, Wild Turkey 
bourbon, and Jose Cuervo tequila.  The FTC investigated this merger and found that the 
merger would be anticompetitive in two product markets: premium scotch and premium 
gin.
30  In order to obtain FTC approval, Diageo agreed to divest its Bombay and Bombay 
Sapphire gin brands and Dewars scotch brand to another large spirits company, Bacardi, 
for 1.9 billion dollars.  Despite this divestiture, the merger could still have led to 
anticompetitive effects.  As mentioned above, the firms each had large portfolios of 
liquor brands.  If substitution took place between broader sets of premium brands than the 
FTC alleged, it would not be surprising to observe a post-acquisition price increase.  In 
fact, the distilled spirits business contains a relatively small number of players that 
control large portfolios of popular brands of distilled spirits.  Because the companies 
                                                 
27 As defined by the FTC/DOJ’s 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 1.5. 
28 New York Times, June 7, 1997. 
29 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9712/scotch.htm 
30 See the FTC press release at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9712/scotch.htm.   14
owned a very large brand portfolio, we have decided to limit our attention to the price 
effects of three major types of spirits the two firms sold: scotches, gins, and vodkas. 
 
Pennzoil/Quaker State   
  In December of 1998 Pennzoil bought Quaker State in an acquisition valued at 1 
billion dollars.
31  While the two firms were also competitors in the quick lube market 
(Pennzoil’s Jiffy Lube and Quaker State’s Quick Lube), this study focuses on the 
competitive effects in the passenger car motor oil market.  Passenger car motor oil is sold 
through a number of channels.  Bulk motor oil is sold to quick lube operations and auto 
repair shops by all of the major motor oil companies.  It is likely that branded motor oil 
sold through this channel does not command a premium price, as consumers who use 
special service stations to change their oil likely do not know (or perhaps care) what 
brand of motor oil is used in their car.  In contrast, consumers who change their own oil, 
who account for roughly 45%
32 of all oil changes, appear to have strong brand 
preferences for motor oil.
33   
There are three primary types of motor oil sold in the U.S.  Conventional motor 
oil, which sells for $1.00 to $1.75 a quart, is the most common form of motor oil for use 
in every day driving and accounts for about 88% of sales revenue (and 96% of the 
volume) in our data.  Semi-synthetic and synthetic motor oils are considerably more 
expensive ($2.50-$4.00) and are marketed to people with heavy duty engines (such as 4 
wheel drive trucks) or high performance engines (such as sports cars).  Synthetic and 
semi-synthetic motor oils claim to reduce engine wear and can be used in the engine for 
longer periods of time between oil changes.  Because synthetics and semi-synthetics 
represent a niche in the motor oil market and because neither Pennzoil nor Quaker State 
was very successful in this niche at the time of the merger, we focus on conventional 
motor oils in this study.
34   
Within the conventional motor oil market there are substantial differences (30%-
50%) in the prices and perceived quality of the five “premium” motor oils (Castrol, 
                                                 
31 The Houston Chronicle. September 19, 1998. 
 
32 The Detroit News. May 23, 2000. 
33 For example, the premium branded motor oil companies spent 127 million dollars on advertising in 2000.   15
Havoline, Pennzoil, Quaker State, and Valvoline) sold in the U.S. relative to the price and 
quality of the large number of regular brands (typically private label or branded with a 
gasoline company name, e.g., Exxon or Chevron).  Hence, the merger represented the 
merger of two of the five brands of premium motor oil.  However, competition from 
different types of motor oil (semi-synthetics and synthetics), a large number of generic or 
gasoline brand motor oils, and a general trend away from do-it-yourself oil changes to 
quick-lube facilities would likely mitigate the potential anticompetitive effects of the 
merger.  Possibly for these reasons, the merger was approved without any modification 
required by the antitrust agencies. 
 
General Mills/Ralcorp 
  In January 1997, General Mills purchased the branded cereal business of Ralcorp 
(primarily the Chex cereals and Chex snack mix) in a transaction valued at 570 million 
dollars.  Ralcorp retained its private label cereal business (the largest private label cereal 
producer in the U.S.).
35 At the time of the merger, the RTE cereal market comprised only 
five major participants (General Mills, Kellogg’s, Post, Quaker, and Ralcorp), and had 
long been subject to antitrust scrutiny.
36  In April 1996 (just prior to the merger’s 
announcement) a widely reported price war broke out among the major manufacturers.  
Post lowered the prices of its cereals by 20%, and issued coupons that were good for 
discounts on the purchase of any Post cereal.  General Mills and Kellogg’s responded by 
lowering the prices on some of their cereal brands.  It was in this newly competitive 
environment that the FTC reviewed the merger and allowed it to proceed with only minor 
revisions.
37  However, from a strictly structural perspective (that is, a highly concentrated 




                                                                                                                                                 
34 Castrol and Mobil 1 were the leading brands of synthetic motor oils. 
35 Milling & Baking News. January  21, 1997. 
36 The industry was subject to a long investigation by the FTC, and was sued by the FTC for violating the 
antitrust laws the 1970’s.    16
Aurora Foods’ Purchase of Kraft’s Breakfast Syrup Business 
Aurora Foods is a holding company that owns a number of popular brands of food 
products, including Duncan Hines cake mix, Mrs. Pauls fish products, Lenders bagels, 
and Celeste pizzas.  In July 1997, Aurora, which owned the Mrs. Butterworth brand of 
maple flavored breakfast syrup, purchased the Log Cabin syrup brand from Kraft for 222 
million dollars.  At the time of the acquisition, there were three major brands of breakfast 
syrup (Aunt Jemima, Log Cabin, and Mrs. Butterworth), a brand with strong regional 
distribution (Hungry Jack), and a number of small regional brands and private label 
brands (see table 1h for market shares).  On the surface, this merger would appear to be 
problematic as it combined two of the three major branded products in one company.  
However, there were many substitutes for these products at lower price levels (private 
label syrups), at higher price levels (real maple syrups), and among other types of 
flavorings for breakfast foods, e.g., jams and jellies.  According to the trade press, part of 
the justification for the transaction was that Log Cabin did not fit well into Phillip 
Morris’s food portfolio, and that Aurora (which purchases and markets established brands 
of food products) could more effectively sell the product.
38  There does not appear to be 
any public mention of either of the antitrust agencies investigating the merger. 
 
IV.  Data Description 
  A.  Source of Data 
  All of the price and quantity data used in this study were purchased from 
Information Resources Incorporated (IRI).  For each merger we purchased data on 
weekly total revenue and unit sales for each specific Universal Product Code (UPC) in 
the relevant product category,
39 information sufficient to determine the manufacturers 
selling the products, and descriptions of the categories the products fell in.  For example, 
in examining the RTE cereal market, we purchased data on each specific item of 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 The FTC’s modifications gave Ralcorp the right to sell private label Chex immediately following the 
merger (instead of waiting 18 months), and gave Ralcorp the right to transfer its right to make private label 
Chex to a third party without General Mills permission. (FTC Press Release. May 27, 1997.) 
38 According to one press account Philip Morris spent just $7500 advertising Log Cabin in 1996.  Chicago 
Tribune, October 20, 1997. 
39 A UPC describes each product and package size uniquely.  For example, a 10 ounce box of Cheerios and 
a 15 ounce box of Cheerios have different UPCs.  Similarly, the 15 ounce box of Honey Nut Cheerios has a 
different UPC than the 15 ounce box of Cheerios.  A UPC forms the basis for scanning in a retail store.   17
Cheerios sold (i.e., data broken out separately for 10, 15, and 20 ounce box sizes). 
Further, to illustrate the product categorizations provided by IRI, RTE cereals are 
grouped into fairly specific groups, e.g., “Adult Fruit and Nut” and “All Family 
Wholesome.”  The other consumer products have similar descriptors in the data.  IRI 
collects the revenue and unit sales data from the major retail channels of distribution 
(mass merchandise, drug stores, food stores, and convenience stores) at a sample of stores 
in a region and then (using proprietary methods) projects what the sales are within a 
metropolitan area for that channel.  Since these data are obtained from the retail scanners 
that record consumer purchases, they are referred to as “scanner” data.   
In purchasing data for this study, we chose the available channels that best 
represented consumer purchases of the relevant consumer products.  For the two food 
product mergers (cereal and pancake syrup), the obvious channel choice was IRI’s food 
channel (data from 64 InfoScan food markets which roughly correspond to metropolitan 
areas, see appendix table 2 for a list of the various InfoScan markets).  For feminine 
hygiene products, the two choices were IRI’s food channel and mass merchandiser 
channel.  Both channels are important in the sale of these products.  Because the mass 
merchandiser channel only covers 10 InfoScan markets, we elected to use the data from 
the food channel.  In fact, sales through the IRI food channel are quite substantial.  
Annual dollar sales of feminine hygiene products were $1.7 billion in 1997
40 while sales 
in the IRI food channel during 1997 were approximately $570 million, accounting for 
33% of sales during the time period.   
Motor oil sales to the consumer market are primarily made through mass 
merchandisers and auto parts stores.  For this reason, we used data from IRI’s mass 
merchandiser channel for the 10 InfoScan markets where data is collected. While these 
10 markets represent only a fraction of the U.S., they include the largest metropolitan 
areas. 
For the liquor market, the only data set available for our time period was a drug 
store sample containing information from 10 InfoScan markets, and complete data were 
available for only 5 of the InfoScan markets from three states (San Francisco, CA, San 
                                                 
40 Supermarket Business, January, 1998. 
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Diego, CA, Los Angeles, CA, Chicago, IL, and Phoenix, AZ).  This data source has 
several shortcomings.  Since we could only observe pricing behavior in a small number 
of markets, and since local liquor distributors have limited ability to transship products 
between states to eliminate any price discrimination attempted by distributors, our results 
may not be generalizeable to the U.S.   
In addition, our data come from one only retail channel of distribution, drug 
stores, which is certainly not the main distribution channel for distilled spirits.  It is likely 
that the product selection seen in drug stores is much narrower than in liquor stores.  
While the drug stores typically carry the major brands of spirits they do not appear to sell 
all the format sizes available.  For example, in our data we found that the price series are 
incomplete for large bottle sizes for many scotches (e.g., Johnny Walker Black, Dewars 
White Label), which are almost certainly available in liquor stores.  This could be an 
important issue if manufacturers offered substantial quantity discounts on large bottle 
sizes (1.75 liter bottles) relative to small bottle sizes (750 milliliters).
41  This would affect 
the results of our study if the merger caused firms to alter the pricing of large bottle sizes 
relative to small bottle sizes.  In fact, for the products where we had data on both large 
and small package sizes, we found the price effects of the merger were different, although 
not in any systematic way. 
 
B.  Definition of Price 
Since many consumer products come in different package sizes, often at very 
different prices (because of quantity discounts), it is not straightforward to define the 
price of a “product”.  In this study, we purchased data at the UPC level to examine how 
different aggregation techniques affected the measure of price, and the estimated price 
effect of the merger.  The techniques we used to create measures of price vary by product 
type because of institutional factors specific to each market.  In this section we describe 
in detail the methods used to construct price separately by product category. 
                                                 
41 While distilled spirits are sold in a number of package sizes (single serving, 375 milliliters, 750 
milliliters, 1 liter, and 1.75 liters), the vast majority of spirits are sold in the 750 milliliter and 1.75 liter 
bottle sizes.   19
The motor oil products in our data are sold in either one quart packages or five 
quart packages.
42  The vast majority of sales we observe are of the one quart package 
size, and we have an unbroken time series for prices for this package size.  Since the per 
unit price discount is not large for purchasing one quart versus five quart units, we 
aggregate sales over the two package sizes.  Thus, the measure of price we are using for 
motor oil is the average revenue per quart (motor oil revenue for all package sizes/ motor 
oil quarts for all package sizes).  The other important institutional detail in the motor oil 
industry is a product’s “weight.”  Each vehicle’s engine is designed to take a certain 
weight of oil.  The most popular weights of motor oil are 10W30, 5W30, and 10W40 and 
we have restricted our analysis to these weights.
43  As a practical matter, when one brand 
of motor oil goes on sale all of the popular weights of oil are also likely to go on sale, and 
most of the weights have about the same price point.  However, to minimize 
measurement error we calculate separate measures of price for each brand and weight of 
motor oil. 
  Distilled spirits are sold in many bottle sizes, but the vast majority of sales are of 
1.75 liter and 750 milliliter bottles.  Because the two different bottle sizes are priced and 
promoted very differently (with the 1.75 liter bottle having more retail “sales”; i.e., 
temporary price discounts), it would not be appropriate to aggregate the two package 
sizes and create a single “price” for a brand of spirits.  We analyze the price of the 
different bottle sizes separately.  The only aggregation over UPCs we do is when there 
are multiple UPCs corresponding to the same brand and bottle size, e.g., a holiday 
version of a brand of spirits.  For this aggregation, we calculate the price of a brand of 
spirits as the average revenue (revenue/units) for that brand and bottle size, e.g., all types 
of Johnny Walker Red Scotch sold in 750 milliliter bottles. 
We have calculated five different measures of average price for breakfast syrups, 
cereals and feminine hygiene products.  The exact calculation of each measure varies by 
product type due to institutional factors discussed in more detail below.  To be 
comparable with research by others, such as  Nevo (2000), we first calculate the standard 
measure of price, average revenue (total revenue/total units sold of a given brand, e.g., 
                                                 
42 A typical motor engine requires five quarts of oil, hence the 5 quart package size.   20
General Mills Cheerios).  However, we are concerned about the accuracy of this measure 
of price because these products are sold in many different package sizes, often with 
substantial quantity discounts.  Because a 10 ounce box of Cheerios may be perceived as  
a different good than a 15 ounce box of Cheerios, it may oversimplify matters to create 
an aggregate price of Cheerios across all package sizes.  Unfortunately, there are too 
many brands and package sizes in these markets to calculate price separately by package 
size (unlike the case for spirits).  However, in contrast to the spirits market, the pricing 
behavior of manufacturers does not appear to differ much across package sizes.  Thus, we 
construct a price index for each product that explicitly accounts for the pricing of the 
different product’s package sizes.  Below we describe how each index is calculated for 
each market. 
We calculated four different measures of price for syrup that accounted for 
different package sizes.  The first two measures are variations on a simple weighted 
average price.  We first calculated the proportion of revenue earned for each bottle size of 
a given brand during the first (last) year in our data.  We then calculated price as the 
weighted average of the price of each bottle size of syrup using the revenue weights.  The 
two measures of simple weighted average price use either first year or last year revenue 
weights.  The second two measures of price use Stone price indexes using either the first 
or last year’s revenue weights.
44 
We used the same general approach for aggregating RTE cereal as we used for 
maple flavored syrups.  The added complications in aggregation come from the 
manufacturers changing or temporarily discontinuing package sizes.  For those products 
(which accounted for roughly 10% of RTE cereal revenue) that changed package size 
during the sample period, for example, the standard box size changed from 14.5 ounces 
to 14 ounces, we redefined the UPC so it appears that the same package size appeared 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Some weights of motor oil have specialty purposes, e.g., boat engine oil, are not sold in high volume, or 
are not carried in all locations.  Hence, we limit the analysis to the three most popular weights. 
44 The stone price index is define as 
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1 ω = ∑ ).  See, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) or Hausman and Leonard (2002) for a similar use 
of the Stone price index.   21
during the entire sample period, and we adjust the ounces sold appropriately.  For box 
sizes that do not appear for the entire sample period (such as Chex cereals, which are 
periodically offered in a large box size a few months of the year), we calculate the price 
per ounce for the cereal, compare the price to the most popular size of the cereal, and if 
the price difference is not too large (less than a 25% difference) we ascribe the sales of 
that package size to the most popular package size and adjust the sales and price for that 
package size accordingly.  After dealing with these two complications, we then use the 
techniques described for syrup to construct two measures of a simple weighted price and 
two measures of a Stone price index. 
The general approach used to create an average price for feminine hygiene 
products is the same as for RTE cereal and syrup with a few additional complications.  
Feminine hygiene products, particularly sanitary pads, come in a number of different 
product variations that are marketed jointly.  For example, sanitary pads are typically sold 
in thin, medium, and heavy variations.  A particular brand of pads, such as P&G’s 
Always, will use the same brand name for all sizes of its product, and will charge the 
same package price for each pad size (but alter the quantity in the package so that  unit 
costs may vary), and will put the items on sale at the same time.  Because of the joint 
marketing of the products it does not seem sensible to treat each variation of the product,  
such as Always thin pad vs. Always thick pad, as separate products.  Instead, we want to 
create a single measure of price for each brand of pad.  Thus, in constructing our price 
indices we calculate revenue shares for all package sizes and variations of feminine 
hygiene products.  Thus, we again have four measures of price, two simple average prices 
(using revenue weights from either the first or last year of the sample period) and two 
Stone price indices. 
 
V.  Empirical Model 
The major issue faced by any attempt to estimate the effect of a merger on prices, 
as with any evaluation of an intervention using non-experimental data, is the method used 
to control for other confounding factors that may also have changed at the time of the 
event.   Of especial concern is the effect of possible changes in demand or costs on 
prices.    The methods we use to control for these factors are familiar from the literature   22
on “difference-in-differences” estimation and focus on the selection of a control group 
and the selection of a window of data surrounding the events we study.
45  The former is 
important for dealing with permanent time-varying factors while the latter can be very 
useful in dealing with transitory time-varying factors.    
We prefer an event window that is long enough to capture any change in price 
associated with the change in market structure, but short enough to avoid any 
contaminating effects from other changes in the market.  We consider three different 
merger windows.  Our preferred merger window drops the 3 months of data preceding 
and following the merger consummation and contains a symmetric amount of data pre- 
and post-merger.
46  By dropping the data very close to the merger date, we avoid the 
issue of exactly when the firms start coordinating their pricing behavior, leaving us with 
uncontaminated measures of the firms’ pre- and post-merger pricing.
47  By using a 
symmetric difference-in differences estimator we also control for any unspecified 
transitory selection effects so long as the pricing error process is covariance stationary.
48   
We have also analyzed an alternative event window that includes data in the 
interval within 3 months of the merger date and contains an equal amount of data pre- 
and post-merger.  This event window may suffer from contamination of the data around 
the time of the merger, but it does provide a larger sample for analysis. Finally, since for 
most of the mergers we have considerably more data post-merger than pre-merger, we 
also consider an event window that uses all of the data available to us, but still drops 
those observations within three months of the merger date.  The advantage of this 
window is that if makes use of all the data, though it may suffer from transitory selection 
effects. 
                                                 
45 See Ashenfelter (1978) for an early discussion of these issues, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) for 
subsequent methods, and Heckman and Robb (1985) for a detailed survey of the key issues. 
46 As discussed earlier, the amount of data we have for each of our mergers varies because we were only 
able to purchase data up to 5 years old.  For this reason, the length of the event window varies from merger 
to merger.   
47 By law, merging parties are strictly prohibited from coordinating their pricing behavior during the HSR 
waiting period (when merger review takes place).  However, as a practical matter, there is some evidence 
that firms do change their pricing behavior following their announcement to merge.  For example, Kim and 
Singal (1993) find that many of the airlines increased their fares before the mergers were consummated. 
48 This was first pointed out by Heckman and Robb (1985), and the method is used by Ashenfelter and Card 
(1985).   23
  A potential disadvantage of our event windows is a result of the fact that some 
mergers that result in price increases may also result in a more efficient consolidation of 
resources and a reduction in marginal costs that is ultimately passed through to 
consumers.  The timing of these two effects may differ, however.  Our data only measure 
the relatively short-run price effects of consumer products mergers.
49 
We consider two different comparison groups as controls for permanent time-
varying factors, such as input cost changes, which might affect prices.  Our preferred 
control group consists of the private label products sold in each industry.  The advantage 
of private label products as a control group is that they are likely to be distant substitutes 
to consumers for the higher quality branded products affected by the merger.  Yet private 
label products should share many of the same inputs (with the exception of advertising) 
as are used to manufacture branded products.  Assuming that these private label products 
are supplied perfectly elastically, the prices of these products should serve as good 
controls for costs, while at the same time they should be relatively unaffected by any 
anticompetitive price increase by the merging parties.  The private label products in the 
control group we select are those with the characteristics closest to the products owned by 
the merging parties.   
For three of the mergers the choice of the private label control group is 
straightforward: private label motor oil, private label tampons, sanitary pads and liners, 
and private label maple flavored syrup.  For the liquor and RTE cereal mergers the choice 
is more difficult because of the wide variety of products.  For the liquor merger we use 
private label gin as the control for gin brands, private label scotch as the control for 
scotch brands, and private label vodka as the control for the vodka brands owned by 
Diageo.  For the RTE cereal market we use the private label cereals in the same IRI 
groupings as the different types of Chex, Wheaties, and Cheerios examined in our study. 
                                                 
49 Even with additional post-acquisition data, it would be very difficult to control for the “but-for” world in 
the markets we are studying.  For example, in the RTE cereal industry in any given year many new 
products are introduced.  A new product changes the demand relationships facing those products that are 
substitutes for the new product, and likely changes equilibrium pricing for reasons unrelated to the merger, 
see e.g., Hausman and Leonard.  Overtime, the net effect of these changes likely grows.  Disentangling the 
price effects of a merger from the price effects resulting from changes in marketing, advertising, new 
product introduction, and exogenous shocks to supply and demand is increasingly difficult as the length of 
time following the merger grows in consumer products industries.   24
The second control group contains the branded products that are close substitutes 
to the products owned by the merging parties.  The primary advantage of this control 
group is it should control for shocks to both demand and cost that affect branded 
products.  An increase in income, for example, may increase the demand for all branded 
products relative to private label products.  The prices of close substitutes to the products 
of the merging firms will thus also increase, serving as a control for the relative demand 
shift.  The disadvantage of this control group is that these products are likely to be close 
enough substitutes to the merging parties’ products that their prices will also increase as a 
result of the merger.  Nevertheless, it is likely that the price increase of these competitors 
to the merged firm will be lower than the price increases of the merging parties.
50 Thus, 
while measuring price changes relative to this control group may understate any price 
increase due to the merger, the sign of the relative price increase should be correct.  In 
view of this weakness of this control group, we primarily view results estimated with it as 
a specification check on the results our private label control group.   
As with the private label control groups, we choose the products with the 
characteristics closest to the merging parties’ products being studied for this second 
control group.  For the feminine protection and syrup markets the control group is 
branded products sold in all 64 geographic markets.  For motor oil, the control group 
consists of the 3 remaining premium brands of conventional motor oil (Havoline, 
Valvoline, and Castrol).  The control group for the liquor merger is branded scotches for 
the scotch market, branded gins for the gin market, and branded vodka’s for the vodka 
market.  For the RTE cereal market we choose the branded cereals in the same IRI 
groupings as the different types of Chex, Wheaties, and Cheerios examined in our study.   
We use the following regression specification fitted separately for each merging 
party product and its relevant control group: 
11
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for the ith product, in the jth city, and the tth time period, where Mijt is a month of the year 
indicator, αij is a region-specific product fixed-effect, Post-Mergerijt is an indicator equal 
                                                 
50 This is a property of the model in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), for example.   25
to one following the merger consummation, and Merging Party Producti is an indicator 
equal to one if the product is owned by the parties.  The price is measured in natural logs 
(either the log of average revenue, log of a weighted average price, or as a Stone price 
index, as noted above).  The fixed-effects (αij) in equation 2 are allowed to vary by both 
product and region because a given product (e.g., Cheerios) may have a different 
permanent price in different regions (e.g., Chicago versus Knoxville) and different 
products may have different permanent price levels (Cheerios versus Wheaties).  We 
include month effects (Mi,j,t) to control for seasonal pricing.  The coefficient β2 measures 
the approximate proportionate price increase of the merging firm’s product relative to 
products in the control group.  To examine how sensitive our results are to the choice of 
control groups, we also estimated regressions without control groups.  Because we are 
observing the prices of the same products in many different markets in each time period, 
we estimate clustered standard errors where we cluster on the time period (Moulton 
(1987)). 
  We also measure changes in the merging parties’ output following the merger as a 
basic specification test of our analysis.  Though the effect of a price increase resulting 
from a merger will generally lead to a decline in quantity sold, in complex multi-product 
mergers these predicted effects depend heavily on the precise structure of the economic 
model used for prediction.   We measure output using both revenue shares and quantity 
shares.
51  Regressions are estimated separately for each product owned by the merging 
parties and are of the form 
11
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  To control for differences in market size each observation is weighted by the size 
of market output in a given region/time period.  We also estimate clustered standard 
errors where we cluster on the time period. 
                                                 
51 Both our price and output regressions are reduced forms of a potentially complex demand system, cost 
function, and equilibrium specification.  A homothetic AID’s model would lead to log price and revenue 
share as the appropriate specification for price and quantity in these reduced forms, but other demand 
systems would lead to other specifications.   26
 
VI.  Results 
  Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 present the basic empirical results.  These tables report 
results using our preferred definition of the merger window (equal amounts of data pre- 
and post-merger and dropping data within the 3 months of the merger consummation).  
The price measure used is average revenue.  Tables 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 present summary 
statistics describing the results using different definitions of the merger window, price, 
and control group.  The results imply that there were consumer price increases for some 
of the products owned by the merging firms in motor oil, feminine hygiene products, 
RTE cereal, and distilled spirits industries.  However, in the four mergers where we find 
substantial evidence of a price increase, manufacturers did not increase all of their prices 
uniformly.  Instead, the merged firm chose to increase the price of one of its products (or 
a set of products) while holding the other prices more or less fixed.  For example, the 
combined Pennzoil/Quaker State substantially increased the price of its Quaker State 
brand of motor oil, while leaving the Pennzoil brand’s price essentially unchanged.  In 
contrast, there is little evidence that the combination of two of the leading brands of 
maple-flavored syrup resulted in any meaningful price change following the merger. 
With one exception (General Mills/Ralcorp), our analysis of the robustness of the 
results suggests that the choice of merger window is not very important for the results, 
but the choice of control group can be.  While the choice of a branded or private label 
control group is not systematically associated with higher or lower estimated price 
changes, in those cases where the differences are most striking (Guinness/Grand 
Metropolitan and P&G/Tambrands) the price effects are larger with the private label 
control group.  Finally, while the choice of a price measure (average revenue or a 
measure which accounts for differences in pricing across package sizes or product 
variations) does not affect the sign of the estimated price effects, the measure does have a 
significant effect on the magnitude of a price increase.  We interpret this result as 
showing the importance of accounting for quantity discounts in studies using scanner 
data.   
While we purchased weekly revenue and unit sales data from IRI, we have 
aggregated the data to monthly data for all of the analysis presented in this paper.  Our   27
goal was to control for the possibility of inventory effects associated with retailer sales. If 
consumers purchase dramatically larger quantities of products during sales, they may take 
the excess they purchase into consumer inventory.
52 By aggregating to the monthly level, 
our goal was to at least partially control for intertemporal purchasing substitution, which 
is not the focus of our study.  We have estimated all specifications of the models 
presented in the paper using monthly and weekly data and found the results to be 
essentially unchanged with one exception.
53  
Finally, we have estimated regressions without control groups for each of the 
products using the model specifications corresponding to tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11.  The 
results appear in appendix tables 3-7.  In virtually every merger, we observe that the price 
level has increased following the merger.  Thus, it seems likely that the price increases 
we observe in our primary difference-in-difference results are not simply due to a poor 
choice of control group.   
  Because the estimated price effects associated with the mergers were not uniform 
across products, the aggregate impact of the mergers cannot readily be determined from 
the results presented in Tables 3-12.  For this reason we have constructed an aggregate 
estimate of the price effect of each merger.  We calculated the aggregate price effect of a 
merger as the (revenue) weighted average of the estimated price effects of the products 
owned by the merging parties using the estimated price effects from our preferred model 
specification (presented in Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11) and the pre-merger relative revenues 
of the affected products.  The exact calculation is specified in equation (3) below.  
P
i=1
ˆ (3)  Merger Effect = ii π β ∑  
Where i π  is product i’s pre-merger revenue share (
P
i=1
1 i π = ∑ ),  ˆ
i β  is the estimated price 
effect for product i, and P is the number of estimated price effects associated with the 
                                                 
52 See Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Pessendorfer (2002) for evidence on the importance of inventory 
effects. 
53 The results with weekly and monthly data yielded very different results for the cereal merger, suggesting 
that consumers take cereal products into household inventory in response to consumer sales.  In addition, 
with weekly data the choice of price measure and control group were very important in the cereal market.  
This is not true with the monthly data.   28
merger.  The estimates are presented in Table 13.
54  Four of the five mergers have 
resulted in modest price increases, ranging from roughly 3% to 7%, when using the 
change in private label products’ prices as a control.  The estimated price effects are, 
however, sensitive to the choice of control group.  The estimated cereal and breakfast 
syrup mergers price effects are larger when using a branded control group while the 
remaining mergers price effects are larger when using a private label control group.  
Finally, we estimated the aggregate price effects of the distilled spirits merger overall and 
separately by product type (gin, scotch, vodka) because the price effects varied so much 




  Table 3 presents the primary results for this merger using the preferred definition 
of the merger window.  The estimated price effects using a branded and private label 
control group are in the first two columns of the table.  The rank of the product’s price 
increase (relative to its respective control group) is in the next two columns.  The final 
four columns contain the estimates of the change in the product’s revenue and quantity 
market shares following the merger (in absolute share points and relative to the product’s 
pre-merger market share). 
Using the private label control group, the post-merger price change for Pennzoil is 
about 4%, for Quaker State 8%, and Quaker State Deluxe about 6%.  The estimated price 
increases are smaller when using the other premium brands of motor oil as the control 
group (essentially no change for Pennzoil, a 2% price increase for Quaker State Deluxe, 
and a 4% price increase for Quaker State).  Quaker State’s price increase is larger than all 
but one of the brands in the control group, and Quaker State Deluxe’s price increase is 
about equal to the median price increase for the control group (smaller than 6 of the 11 
brands in the control group).  The estimated declines in market share are broadly 
consistent with the price increases. While Pennzoil's market share increases, the Quaker 
                                                 
54 The calculation of standard errors assumes negligible covariances among the component estimators.   29
State brands show a significant decrease, e.g., Quaker State loses 1.3 market share points 
that represents a 13.5% decrease of its pre-merger market share.
55   
Table 4 summarizes the results from 6 separate regressions run for each of the 3 
brands studied (for a total of 18 estimated coefficients).  The table shows how the results 
change relative to the event window used (the first three columns) and relative to the 
control group (the last two columns).  For example, for the private label control group, all 
of the estimated price effects are positive (row 1) and statistically significant (row 2).  Of 
the 9 price effects estimated with the private label control group, 3 are between 1% and 
5% and 6 are greater than 5%.  The results do not appear to be sensitive to the choice of 
merger window, and the price effects appear lower when using the premium brands as a 
control group.  However, as can be seen from the frequency distributions, the price 
increases are not large, most being less than 5%.  These results suggest that the combined 
Pennzoil/Quaker State chose to increase prices to those users loyal to Quaker State and to 
maintain stable prices on its much larger Pennzoil brand.  However, given the large 
increase in Pennzoil's market share, it clearly grew at the expense of its rivals and not 
only from the market share diversion from Quaker State. 
 
  Proctor and Gamble/Tambrands 
  Table 5 presents the estimated price effects, rank of estimated price effects 
relative to control group, and corresponding changes in revenue and quantity market 
shares for the Proctor/Tambrands purchase, while Table 6 presents a summary of the 
results from the other specifications examined.  While tampons and sanitary pads may not 
appear to be close substitutes to consumers, the results suggest that P&G increased the 
price of pads, liners, and possibly tampons following its acquisition of Tambrands.  The 
results in Table 5 show that relative to private label products, Always liners and pads 
prices increased by 8% and Tampax Tampons prices increased by 4%.  When compared 
to the price of branded products, Always liners and pads still increased (6%, 4%) but 
Tampax tampon prices appear to be unchanged (-0.9%).  The Always liners and pad price 
increases are larger than the products in the branded control group.  However, the change 
                                                 
55 The market shares are calculated for using conventional passenger car motor oil sold through mass-
merchants in the IRI sample using data from the time period 1/5/97 through 12/27/98.   30
in Tampax’s price is smaller than the price changes of 2 of the 3 brands in the branded 
control group. The changes in market share are fairly consistent with the estimated price 
changes for Tampax and Always liners, with Tampax showing a loss of 3.08 share points 
(a roughly 6% decrease from its pre-merger share) and Always liners losing 2.98 share 
points.  Always pads show a surprising gain of 1.81 share points despite an increase in its 
price relative to branded and private label pads.
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  The summary of the results in Table 6 also suggests this merger resulted in a price 
increase.  Using the private label control group, 92% of the estimated price effects are 
positive, and 70% of these are significantly different from zero.  When the branded 
control group is used about 78% of the estimated price effects are positive and 59% of 
these are significantly different than zero.  Only one of the 27 price changes estimated 
using the branded control group shows an economically significant (between 1% and 5%) 
post-merger price decrease.  However, as noted above, the private label control group has 
important advantages, because private label producers are less likely to increase their 
prices in response to a price increase by the merging parties.  Finally, the estimated price 
effects are larger when price is measured using average revenue rather than controlling 
for package size using the two weighted price indexes.  While the results do not 
unambiguously show a price increase, on net, the evidence suggests that P&G increased 
the prices of its feminine hygiene products after purchasing Tambrands. 
  
General Mills/Ralcorp 
   The merger of General Mills and Ralcorp involved many different brands of RTE 
cereal.  We have estimated the price effects for the seven brands of General Mills cereals 
we believed were the closest substitutes for the four types of Ralcorp's Chex cereals.  
Table 7 presents the estimated price effects and changes in market share for our preferred 
event window and price measure, and Table 8 summarizes the pricing results for all 
specifications of the model run.  The results in Table 7 suggest that any price increase 
following this acquisition was quite small for the Chex cereals (less than 1%), moderate 
for Cheerios, Multi-Grain Cheerios, and Wheaties (2%-4%), and highly variable for the 
                                                 
56 Market shares for feminine hygiene products are calculated separately for pads, liners, and tampons using 
IRI’s supermarket sample for the pre-merger time period 10/27/96 through 7/20/97.   31
remaining variations of Cheerios and Wheaties (3%-14%).  The estimated price increases 
of Crispy-Raisin Wheaties, Honey-Frosted Wheaties, Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios, and 
Honey-Nut Cheerios are very sensitive to the choice of control group, and are roughly 
5%-6% larger when using the branded control group.  Further, most of the price changes 
for the non-Chex cereals are in the upper tail of price increases relative to the cereal 
products in either the private label or branded control group.  
The estimated changes in market share following the merger for some cereal 
brands are difficult to reconcile with the post-merger price changes.  Confounding factors 
may have played some roll in these changes in relative output.  The most important factor 
in the RTE cereal category is probably non-price competition, particularly new product 
introductions.  During our time period a number of new products were introduced, 
including two new Chex variations (Frosted and Honey-Nut).  Substitution from existing 
brands of Chex to the new variants may explain the large decreases in market share for 
some types of Chex.  More generally, product entry and exit may result in substantial 
share variation over time.  In addition, some products experienced idiosyncratic changes 
in demand.  For example, two of the Wheaties products (Crispy Raisin and Honey 
Frosted) were new at the beginning of our time period and may have experienced some 
drop in market share as a result of consumer experimentation.  Cheerios had a modest 
increase in relative price (4%) and increased its market share by 0.5 share points, a 
roughly 13% increase over its pre-merger share.
57  This may have been the result of 
Cheerios rebuilding its share following a widely publicized incident where contractors 
accidentally sprayed raw oats with an unapproved pesticide which resulted in the 
destruction of 50 million boxes of Cheerios in 1994.
58 
The estimated price effects vary for two of the three types of robustness checks 
summarized in Table 8.  The choice of event window has some effect on the magnitude 
of the estimated price effects of the merger.  When using a symmetric event window and 
keeping the data around the merger consummation date, the proportion of economically 
significant price effects (a predicted price change greater than 1%) increases relative to 
the alternative event windows.  In addition, the magnitude of the estimated price changes 
                                                 
57 Market shares for the cereal merger are calculated over the entire set of RTE cereals using IRI’s 
supermarket sample and pre-merger data from 7/2/95 through 1/26/97.   32
is somewhat smaller when using the private label control group rather than the branded 
control group (see Table 8, columns 7 and 8).   
The choice of price measure does not appear to be very important when using 
monthly data (see first 3 columns of Table 8).  However, when the same specifications 
were estimated using weekly data, the estimated price effects were much larger using the 
average revenue measure of price than with either of the weighted price indices (in fact, 
all estimated price effects were larger using weekly data).  This sensitivity of the results 
to aggregation over time suggests that consumers may take RTE cereal products into 
inventory in response to retail sales.  In addition, the sensitivity of the estimated price 
effects to the measure of price in weekly data suggests that consumers may substitute 
across package sizes in response to sales.  Because larger package sizes are inferior goods 
(e.g., more difficult to store, increased likelihood of spoilage), these results suggest that 
controlling for package sizes in may be important. 
While the magnitude of the price changes following the General Mills acquisition 
of the Chex brands varied significantly from specification to specification, some general 
conclusions can be drawn.  First, the estimated price changes for the Chex products were 
always small, between a 1% price decrease and a 2% price increase.  Second, the price 
changes of the variants of Wheaties (Crispy Raisin and Honey Frosted) and Cheerios 
brands (Honey-Nut and Apple-Cinnamon) were very sensitive to the choice of control 
group.  Third, the results strongly suggest that General Mills cereal prices did not fall 
after its acquisition of the Chex brands. Virtually every estimated price effect 
summarized in Table 8 is positive (90%), and none of the estimated price decreases are 
economically significant; i.e., a price decrease of more than 1%.  The merger apparently 
did not generate cost savings that were passed through to consumers in the form of lower 
prices in the time period studied. 
The predicted price effects of General Mills purchase of the Chex brands from 
Nevo (2000) are very different from our findings.  Nevo predicts price increases (before 
efficiencies) of 12.2% for Chex (all of the Chex brands combined), 1.1% for Cheerios, 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 The Wall Street Journal, August 22, 1994.      33
0.8% for Honey Nut Cheerios, and 0.1% for Wheaties.
59  The quantity responses (before 
efficiencies) are predicted to be –19% for Chex, -1.3% for Cheerios, -0.9% for Honey 
Nut Cheerios, and –0.1% for Wheaties.  Clearly, these predicted price changes are very 
different from what we have found (measured relative to either control group).  It is 
unclear why Nevo’s predictions were so different than our estimates.  Possible 
explanations include the use of a different data set (quarterly data from1988-1992), the 
confounding effect of new product introductions
60 or changes in market structure in the 
1990s, and the form of the demand structure used.   
 
Guinness /Grand Metropolitan 
  The distilled spirits merger involved many brands.  For brevity, we refer to our 
results separately for the three major types of spirits affected by the transaction: vodkas, 
gins, and scotches.  The results in Table 9 (and the summary statistics in Table 10) 
suggest that the scotch merger resulted in a price increase.  For the four brands of scotch 
(three in two bottle sizes), all the model specifications show a significant price increase.  
The relative magnitude of the price increases are at or above the median of the branded 
control group (Table 10, column 3 for the scotch brands).  The frequency distribution in 
Table 10 shows that 22 of the 42 estimated price increases are between 1% and 5% and 
20 are greater than 5%.   
The results for gins and vodkas are more ambiguous.  The key factor appears to 
be the choice of control group.  In Table 9 when using the private label control group, 
about 71% (15 of 21) of the estimated price effects for gins and vodkas are positive.  
However, when using the branded control group, all but one of the brands of gin and 
vodka show a price decrease following the merger.  These results are also seen in the 
                                                 
59 See Nevo (2000), Table 5.  His study does not analyze the other varieties of Cheerios and Wheaties 
examined here (those brands had not been introduced in Nevo’s sample period). 
60 In purchasing the Chex cereals from Ralcorp, General Mills likely knew that Ralcorp would begin selling 
private label Chex.  As noted earlier, the consent decree reached between the FTC and Ralcorp gave 
Ralcorp the right to produce private label cereal immediately following the sale of its branded cereal 
business.  While Ralcorp did not begin selling private label versions of Chex cereals during our sample 
period, private label Chex was on supermarket shelves within a few years following the close of the 
transaction (and is still available today).  General Mills may not have changed Chex pricing because of this 
anticipated entry.   Virtually all merger simulations (including Nevo’s) are made assuming the set of 
existing set of products is constant; i.e., the simulations cannot account for unanticipated new product 
development.     34
summary statistics in Table 10.  For the 21 types of gins and vodkas (brands and bottle 
sizes), 53 of the 63 price changes estimated with a private label control group are positive 
while only 18 of the 63 price changes estimated with the branded control group are 
positive. 
  The estimated share changes are not entirely consistent with the estimated price 
effects.  For the scotches, J&B in the 750ml, Johnny Walker Red in the 750ml  and 1.75L 
bottle, and Scoresby in the 1.75L bottle show share decreases.  However, Johnny Walker 
Black 750ml, and Scoresby 750ml, show significant share increases.  The only 
explanation we can find for this result is that the price increase in large bottle sizes 
caused consumers to substitute to the smaller bottle size.
61  The results for the gins and 
vodkas seem to be quite variable.  The largest increases, for the citrus versions of 
Gordon's and Smirnoff vodkas can be explained by the large growth taking place during 
this time for flavored vodkas.   
 
  Aurora Foods/Kraft 
The one merger where we find no strong evidence of a post-merger price increase 
is in the Aurora Foods (owner of Mrs. Butterworth) purchase of Kraft's Log Cabin brand 
of maple flavored breakfast syrup.  The results in Table 11 show that neither the price of 
Mrs. Butterworth or Log Cabin changed much following the acquisition.  While the 
estimated price of Log Cabin relative to other brands of maple flavored syrup increases 
by 3% in Table 11, this result is not robust to model specification.  An examination of 
Table 12 shows that across control groups, measures of price, and merger window 
definitions about two-thirds of the price changes fall between a 1% price decrease and a 
1% price increase.  The results from the market share regressions are consistent with our 
conclusion that prices did not change significantly as a result of this merger.  Neither of 
the estimated changes in market share for Mrs. Butterworth or Log Cabin is economically 
or statistically significant.  From a market structure perspective, the results from this 
merger are the most surprising.  Since the result of the merger was essentially a decrease 
from three to two competitors,  most theoretical models would predict this merger to  be 
                                                 
61 This explanation may be correct, given the market shares for the large bottle sizes is much larger than the 
small bottle sizes; i.e., the small bottle sizes may, on net, be picking up some diversion.   35
anticompetitive.  Apparently the wide variety of substitutes of both superior (real maple 
syrups) and inferior (private label brands) products, restrained Aurora Foods from 
increasing prices. 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
  Merger review makes up the largest component of antitrust enforcement in the 
U.S.  In the late 1990’s, the U.S. economy went through the largest merger wave in its 
history with the number of merger filings more than doubling between 1994 and 1999.  
Despite the increase in merger activity, the number of lawyers and economists employed 
at the antitrust agencies remained more or less constant.  Given the huge increase in 
workload, the agencies clearly had to make difficult choices in deciding which cases to 
pursue during this time period. 
In four of the five mergers we investigated, prices appeared to increase a small 
but significant amount, typically between 3% and 7%.  However, our sample of mergers 
is deliberately not representative of the vast majority of transactions analyzed by the 
antitrust agencies during the late 1990s.  We deliberately chose to study the effect on 
consumer prices of those consummated mergers that would be most expected to result in 
anticompetitive price increases in order to provide (1) an upper bound on the price 
increases that permitted mergers may have produced and (2) a lower bound on the price 
increases that might otherwise have occurred in mergers that were blocked.  We thus 
provide an indication of whether government merger policy may have been too hostile or 
too acquiescent.   
A complete evaluation of the appropriate level of governmental intervention in 
monitoring mergers is beyond the scope of this paper.  We do think, however, that some 
advocates of less intervention may be surprised to learn that our best estimate of the price 
effects of the marginal merger are positive, not negative as would be the case if the 
marginal merger were producing large benefits to consumers through the efficiency of the 
enlarged firm.  Likewise, we think that some advocates of more intervention may be 
surprised to learn that the marginal merger is not producing huge anticompetitive price 
increases either.     36
Our results have several limitations.  First, we chose to study consumer products 
industries because the price and quantity data required to estimate the competitive effects 
of these consummated mergers are readily purchased.  During the two-year period from 
which are sample is drawn (1997 and 1998) 8013 mergers were filed with the antitrust 
agencies.  Of these, 20% were in industries that share the two digit SIC codes of the 
merging firms we study.  Thus, the mergers we examine are from only a small, although 
economically important part of the universe of mergers that took place during the period 
we study.   
Second, we are not able to analyze either the possible longer term effects of 
mergers on prices that may result from the increased economic efficiency of merged 
firms, nor are we able to study the role of mergers in the development of new products. 
Finally, our study has only examined the implications of Type II errors, the failure 
to block a merger when it might be useful to do so.  Our study does not analyze Type I 
errors, rejecting mergers that would not have resulted in higher prices or pro-competitive 
mergers that were never even attempted because of the merging parties’ belief that the 
merger would be successfully challenged.  It is possible that by allowing some 
anticompetitive mergers to take place, the government may also allow many efficient 
mergers to take place that would have been challenged by a stricter antitrust policy.  A 
complete evaluation of optimal enforcement behavior must be based on a consideration 
of all these issues.  
We also think that our results suggest the outline of much further additional 
research.  First, it seems that the evaluation of merger simulation models by a comparison 
of predicted and actual outcomes is in its infancy.  In view of the extensive use to which 
these models are put, a careful evaluation of their effectiveness seems long over due.  
Second, the advent of the wide availability of scanner and other proprietary price data 
could, with some organizational effort, be far more widely exploited by the research 
community.  In principle, the companies that collect and sell these data have a natural 
interest in their wider use.
62 
                                                 
62 A natural analogy is to the development of the CRSP data so widely used in financial economics.  The 
Center for Research on Security Prices apparently resulted from the collaboration of faculty at the Graduate 
School of Business at the University of Chicago with Merrill Lynch, whose data they used.  See 
http://www.crsp.chicagogsb.edu/crsp/history.html.   37
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Actions to Second 
Requests
Mergers in SIC 20 
(Food and Kindred 
Products)
Mergers in SIC 26 
(Paper and Allied 
Products)




1991 1529 1376 64 4.65% 42 65.63% 40 11 5
1992 1589 1451 44 3.03% 22 50.00% 36 19 5
1993 1846 1745 71 4.07% 32 45.07% 91 19 11
1994 2305 2128 73 3.43% 50 68.49% 81 21 11
1995 2816 2612 101 3.87% 60 59.41% 89 31 15
1996 3087 2864 99 3.46% 57 57.58% 99 47 18
1997 3702 3438 122 3.55% 57 46.72% 107 38 15
1998 4728 4575 125 2.73% 85 68.00% 160 59 23
1999 4642 4340 111 2.56% 76 68.47% 141 44 12
2000 4926 4749 98 2.06% 80 81.63% 93 52 26
2001 2376 2237 70 3.13% 55 78.57% 65 15 7
2002 1187 1142 49 4.29% 34 69.39% 32 11 9
2003 1014 968 33 3.41% 36 109.09% 29 8 7
2004 1454 1377 35 2.54% 24 68.57% 33 13 7
Total 37201 35002 1095 3.13% 710 64.84% 1096 388 171
Source: Table 5 Pautler (2003), HSR Annual Report, 1991-2004.
Mergers in SIC categories reported for the acquiring person.
Table 1: Merger Filings by Fiscal YearIndustry
Pre-Acquisition Owner 





General Mills Cheerios, Wheaties 28%
Ralcorp Chex 4%
Guinness Tanqueray, Scoresby  21%
Grand Metropolitian J&B, Johnny Walker, Smirnoff 22%
Pennzoil Pennzoil Motor Oils 29%
Quaker State Quaker State Motor Oils 9%
Proctor and Gamble Always Pads and Liners 25%
Tambrands Tampax Tampons 19%
Philip Morris (Log Cabin) Log Cabin 19%
Aurora Foods Mrs. Butterworth 15%
1Market shares and HHI's calculated using pre-merger revenue data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data, 7/2/1995 - 1/26/97.
2Market shares and HHI's calculated using pre-merger revenue data from 5 regions in IRI's drug store channel data, 10/27/96 - 12/14/97.
3Market shares and HHI's calculated using pre-merger revenue data from 10 regions in IRI's mass merchandiser channel data, 1/05/97 - 12/27/98.
4Market shares and HHI's calculated using pre-merger revenue data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data, 10/27/96 - 7/20/97.















1990Table 3: Estimated Price and Quantity Effects of the Pennzoil/Quaker State Merger
1
Price Effects
Relative Rank of Brand's Price Increase to 
Control Group
2 Revenue Share Quantity Share

















0.004 0.039 8/12 1/2 4.22 18.47% 4.46 21.01%
0.015 0.019 0.83 1.12
0.035 0.081 1/12 1/2 -1.31 -13.58% -1.32 -14.25%
0.016 0.015 0.47 0.53
0.021 0.061 4/12 1/2 -0.16 -5.95% -0.13 -5.32%
0.021 0.022 0.13 0.14
1Estimated coefficient in bold, standard errors in regular font.
2Ranked in descending order, e.g., 8/12 implies that 7 products in the control group had larger estimated price increases and 4 products had smaller price increases.
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data.
Data from 10 regions in IRI's mass merchandiser channel data. 




An observation is a product-city-month.  The number of observations varies by specification, however, the regressions using the branded (private label) control group have roughly 9,000 
(2,000) observations. More Data Post-Acquisition, Drop 
Data Within 3 Months of Merger
Symmetric Event Window, Drop 
Data Within 3 Months of Merger
Symmetric Event 





Percent of positive price changes 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Percent of positive price changes with                  
t-statistic>2 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 33.33% 100.00%
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes:
Δp<-.05 0 0 0 0 0
-0.05 <Δp < -0.01 0 0 0 0 0
-0.01 <Δp < 0.01 1 1 1 3 0
0.01 <Δp < 0.05 3 3 3 6 3
Δp > 0.05 2 2 2 0 6
Number of Estimated Price Effects 6 6 6 9 9
1 A total of 18 regressions were estimated: 3 definitions of the event window, 2 control groups, and 3 products owned by the merging firms (3*2*3=18). Columns 2, 3, and 4 describe the 
changes that result from using a different event window (pooling the results from both control groups), columns 5 and 6 describe the changes that result from using a different control group 
(pooling the results from all event windows).  
Table 4: Summary of Estimated Price Effects for the Merger of Pennzoil and Quaker State
1 
Event Windows Control GroupsTable 5: Estimated Price and Quantity Effects of Proctor & Gamble's Purchase of Tambrands
1
Price Effects
Relative Rank of Brand's Price Increase 
to Control Group
2 Revenue Share Quantity Share

















0.061 0.080 1/4 1/2 -2.98 -11.05% -3.81 -15.6%
0.008 0.011 0.24 0.23
0.045 0.078 1/3 1/2 1.81 4.17% 0.71 1.8%
0.010 0.012 0.64 0.64
-0.009 0.058 3/4 1/2 -3.08 -5.96% -3.26 -6.3%
0.010 0.012 0.52 0.45
1Estimated coefficient in bold, standard errors in regular font.
2Ranked in descending order, e.g., 8/12 implies that 7 products in the control group had larger estimated price increases and 4 products had smaller price increases.
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data.
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data.




An observation is a product-city-month.  The number of observations varies by specification, however, the regressions with the branded (private label) control group have 








Data Within 3 
Months of Merger
Symmetric Event 
Window, Drop Data 









Percent of positive price changes 83.33% 83.33% 88.89% 88.89% 88.89% 77.78% 77.78% 92.60%
Percent of positive price changes with             
t-statistic>2 77.78% 55.56% 61.11% 72.22% 61.11% 61.11% 59.26% 70.40%
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes:
Δp<-.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.05 <Δp < -0.01 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
-0.01 <Δp < 0.01 2 7 5 3 6 5 10 4
0.01 <Δp < 0.05 4 6 8 2 7 9 9 9
Δp > 0.05 11 4 5 12 5 3 7 13
Number of Estimated Price Effects 18 18 18 18 18 18 27 27
Table 6: Summary of  Estimated Price Effects for Proctor & Gamble's Purchase of Tambrands
1
1 A total of 54 regressions were estimated: 3 definitions of the event window, 2 control groups, 3 measures of price and 3 products owned by the merging firms (3*2*3*3=54). Columns 2, 3, and 4 
describe the changes that result from using different measures of price (pooling the results from both control groups and all event windows), columns 5, 6, and 7 describe the changes that result from 
using different event windows (pooling the results from both control groups and measures of price), columns 8 and 9 describe the changes that result from using a different control group (pooling the 
results from all event windows and measures of price).  
Control Group Event Window Price MeasureTable 7: Estimated Price and Quantity Effects of General Mills' Purchase of Ralcorp
1
Price Effects
Relative Rank of Brand's Price 
Increase to Control Group
2 Revenue Share Quantity Share

















0.046 0.044 27/67 2/11 0.50 12.84% 0.09 2.46%
0.011 0.010 0.08 0.08
0.138 0.067 3/37 1/7 -0.21 -25.80% -0.26 -33.04%
0.013 0.011 0.03 0.03
0.105 0.035 3/37 1/7 -0.04 -1.47% -0.25 -8.88%
0.012 0.011 0.07 0.07
0.029 0.027 31/67 4/11 -0.02 -2.22% -0.06 -10.00%
0.009 0.007 0.02 0.02
0.005 0.003 26/67 1/11 -0.02 -2.50% -0.06 -9.08%
0.017 0.017 0.03 0.03
0.003 0.001 29/67 3/11 -0.04 -12.42% -0.05 -17.10%
0.014 0.014 0.01 0.01
0.007 0.005 27/67 1/11 0.11 10.28% 0.00 -0.24%
0.017 0.016 0.04 0.03
0.008 0.006 25/67 1/11 0.01 1.13% -0.04 -8.15%
0.017 0.017 0.02 0.02
0.027 0.026 30/67 3/11 -0.04 -3.36% -0.16 -13.17%
0.013 0.012 0.04 0.05
0.090 0.028 16/45 3/8 -0.06 -19.38% -0.09 -25.83%
0.020 0.019 0.03 0.03
0.110 0.048 9/45 3/8 -0.11 -26.43% -0.14 -35.00%
0.017 0.014 0.03 0.03
1Estimated coefficient in bold, standard errors in regular font.
2Ranked in descending order, e.g., 8/12 implies that 7 products in the control group had larger estimated price increases and 4 products had smaller price increases.
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data.
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
Monthly data from 7/1995 - 8/1998 excluding 11/1996 – 04/1997.
An observation is a product-city-month.  The number of observations in each regression varies significantly by specification and the size of the affected product's control group.  The regressions with the 













Average Price Stone Price Index
More Data Post-
Acquisition, Drop Data 
Within 3 Months of 
Merger
Symmetric Event 
Window, Drop Data 
Within 3 Months of 
Merger
Symmetric Event 






Percent of positive price changes 93.93% 89.39% 89.39% 81.82% 90.91% 100.00% 98.99% 82.83%
Percent of positive price changes t>2 50.00% 60.61% 60.61% 59.09% 57.58% 54.55% 61.61% 52.53%
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes:
Δp<-.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.05 <Δp < -0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.01 <Δp < 0.01 18 19 19 24 22 10 23 33
0.01 <Δp < 0.05 32 30 30 24 27 41 38 54
Δp > 0.05 16 17 17 18 17 15 38 12
Number of Estimated Price Effects 66 66 66 66 66 66 99 99
Table 8: Summary of Estimated Price Effects for General Mill's Purchase of Ralcorp's Branded Cereal Business
1
1 A total of 198 regressions were estimated: 3 definitions of the event window, 2 control groups, 3 measures of price and 11 products owned by the merging firms (3*2*3*11=198). Columns 2, 3, and 4 
describe the changes that result from using different measures of price (pooling the results from both control groups and all event windows), columns 5, 6, and 7 describe the changes that result from 
using different event windows (pooling the results from both control groups and measures of price), columns 8 and 9 describe the changes that result from using a different control group (pooling the 
results from all event windows and measures of price).  







Change in Market 
Share
Percentage 
Change in Market 
Share
Change in Market 
Share
Percentage 
Change in Market 
Share
-0.021 0.026 5/11 1/2 0.037 2.37% 0.029 1.84%
0.007 0.014 0.10 0.110
-0.017 0.044 3/11 1/2 -0.395 -39.88% -0.336 -43.04%
0.006 0.011 0.05 0.050
-0.028 -0.004 9/11 1/2 -0.285 -4.75% -0.186 -2.84%
0.007 0.01 0.22 0.230
-0.026 0.004 9/11 1/2 0.115 3.56% 0.160 6.04%
0.006 0.012 0.12 0.120
-0.024 0.011 9/11 1/2 -0.254 -1.55% 0.078 0.41%
0.007 0.011 0.31 0.420
-0.025 0 8/11 1/2 -0.879 -77.68% -1.230 -76.40%
0.008 0.038 0.38 0.630
-0.017 0.038 4/11 1/2 0.538 5.52% 0.209 4.56%
0.007 0.012 0.26 0.150
-0.01 0.067 3/11 1/2 0.247 4.51% 0.064 2.02%
0.006 0.007 0.15 0.100
0.037 0.098 6/18 1/2 -0.435 -2.77% -0.349 -10.87%
0.006 0.019 0.17 0.110
0.029 0.064 10/18 1/2 0.016 0.41% -0.025 -0.95%
0.007 0.023 0.12 0.100
0.03 0.067 8/18 1/2 0.556 11.98% 0.193 10.00%
0.005 0.02 0.08 0.040
0.034 0.088 4/18 1/2 -0.046 -1.07% -0.092 -3.82%
0.005 0.022 0.16 0.100
0.029 0.065 8/18 1/2 -0.157 -3.86% -0.144 -4.86%
0.006 0.017 0.15 0.130
0.029 0.062 8/18 1/2 0.380 42.58% 0.352 45.13%
0.005 0.014 0.02 0.020
0.027 0.055 9/18 1/2 -1.555 -15.47% -2.285 -15.57%
0.006 0.016 0.39 0.640
Table 9: Estimated Price and Quantity Effects of the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan Merger
1
Price Effects
Relative Rank of Brand's Price 
Increase to Control Group













JOHNNY WALKER RED 
.75 SCOTCH
JOHNNY WALKER RED 
1.75 SCOTCH
SCORESBY .75 SCOTCH







Change in Market 
Share
Percentage 
Change in Market 
Share
Change in Market 
Share
Percentage 
Change in Market 
Share
Table 9: Estimated Price and Quantity Effects of the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan Merger
1
Price Effects
Relative Rank of Brand's Price 
Increase to Control Group
2 Revenue Share Quantity Share
-0.038 -0.026 15/20 2/2 -0.191 -70.74% -0.165 -74.55%
0.02 0.032 0.02 0.020
-0.011 0.032 5/20 1/2 -0.421 -20.79% -0.425 -18.01%
0.013 0.017 0.19 0.250
-0.02 0.016 11/20 1/2 -0.002 -0.67% 0.011 4.58%
0.012 0.02 0.02 0.020
-0.034 -0.015 20/20 2/2 0.149 28.46% 0.225 37.97%
0.012 0.01 0.04 0.050
-0.002 0.046 4/20 1/2 0.488 22.59% 0.431 24.46%
0.009 0.007 0.09 0.090
-0.027 0.001 17/20 2/2 0.926 10.12% 1.553 14.45%
0.011 0.007 0.31 0.400
-0.008 0.035 9/20 1/2 0.141 15.33% 0.167 20.24%
0.009 0.011 0.02 0.020
-0.017 0.02 9/20 1/2 -1.285 -22.61% -1.489 -22.16%
0.01 0.008 0.28 0.380
0.003 0.054 3/20 1/2 0.109 21.80% 0.069 21.25%
0.011 0.007 0.02 0.020
-0.036 -0.018 18/20 2/2 0.187 28.33% 0.212 38.36%
0.013 0.006 0.04 0.040
-0.006 0.032 5/20 1/2 -0.060 -1.13% -0.033 -0.95%
0.01 0.011 0.06 0.040
-0.03 -0.004 15/20 2/2 1.081 7.91% 1.461 12.67%
0.011 0.006 0.23 0.250
-0.011 0.03 8/20 1/2 0.044 5.24% 0.025 7.81%























Monthly data 11/1996 - 2/1999 excluding 09/1997 – 02/1998.
An observation is a product-city month.  The number of observations in each regression varies significantly by specification and the size of the affected product's control group.  The regressions 
with the branded (private label) control group range between roughly 1,700 and 3,000 (300 and 600) observations. 
1Estimated coefficient in bold, standard errors in regular font.
2Ranked in descending order, e.g., 8/12 implies that 7 products in the control group had larger estimated price increases and 4 products had smaller price increases.
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 5 regions in IRI's drug store channel data. Gin Scotch Vodka
More Data Post-
Acquisition, Drop Data 
Within 3 Months of 
Merger
Symmetric Event Window, 
Drop Data Within 3 Months 
of Merger
Symmetric Event 






Percent of positive price changes 43.75% 100.00% 58.97% 80.36% 53.57% 60.71% 44.05% 85.71%
Percent of positive price changes                     
t-statistic>2 25.00% 100.00% 29.49% 55.36% 39.29% 48.26% 28.57% 63.10%
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes:
Δp<-.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.05 <Δp < -0.01 23 0 18 8 20 13 37 4
-0.01 <Δ p < 0.01 9 0 27 10 9 17 20 16
0.01 <Δp < 0.05 11 22 28 24 18 19 27 34
Δp > 0.05 5 20 5 14 9 7 0 30
Number of Estimated Price Effects 48 42 78 56 56 56 84 84
Table 10: Summary of Estimated Price Effects for the Merger of Grand Metropolitan and Guinness
1
1 A total of 168 regressions were estimated: 3 definitions of the event window, 2 control groups, 28 products owned by the merging firms (3*2*28=168). Columns 2, 3, and 4 describe the results 
separately for gins, scotches, and vodkas (pooling the results from both control groups and all event windows), columns 5, 6, and 7 describe the changes that result from using different event 
windows (pooling the results from both control groups), columns 8 and 9 describe the changes that result from using a different control group (pooling the results from all event windows).  
Product Type Event Window Control GroupTable 11: Estimated Price and Quantity Effects of Aurora's Purchase of Kraft's Syrup Business
1
Price Effects
Relative Rank of Brand's Price 
Increase to Control Group
2 Revenue Share Quantity Share

















0.028 0.020 17/62 2/4 0.08 0.40% -0.22 -1.20%
0.008 0.016 0.74 0.77
-0.007 -0.015 36/62 3/4 -0.09 -0.57% 0.26 1.89%
0.006 0.015 0.53 0.53
1Estimated coefficient in bold, standard errors in regular font.
2Ranked in descending order, e.g., 8/12 implies that 7 products in the control group had larger estimated price increases and 4 products had smaller price increases.
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data.
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
Monthly data from 11/1996 - 4/1998 excluding 4/1997 – 10/1997.
LOG CABIN
MRS BUTTERWORTH
An observation is a product-city-month.  The number of observations varies by specification, however, the regressions using the branded (private label) control group have roughly 11,000 (1,500) 
observations. Average Revenue
Weighted 
Average Price Stone Price Index
More Data Post-
Acquisition, Drop Data 
Within 3 Months of 
Merger
Symmetric Event 
Window, Drop Data 
Within 3 Months of 
Merger
Symmetric Event 





Percent of positive price changes 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 58.33% 66.67% 75.00% 61.11% 72.22%
Percent of positive price changes t>2 25.00% 8.33% 8.33% 25.00% 8.33% 8.33% 27.78% 0.00%
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes:
Δp<-.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.05 <Δ p < -0.01 3 1 2 4 1 1 1 5
-0.01 <Δp < 0.01 5 7 8 4 6 10 11 9
0.01 <Δp < 0.05 3 4 2 3 5 1 5 4
Δp > 0.05 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Number of Estimated Price Effects 12 12 12 12 12 12 18 18
Table 12: Summary of Estimated Price Effects for Aurora's Purchase of Kraft's Breakfast Syrup Business
1
1 A total of 36 regressions were estimated: 3 definitions of the event window, 2 control groups, 3 measures of price and 2 products owned by the merging firms (3*2*3*2=36). Columns 2, 3, and 4 
describe the changes that result from using different measures of price (pooling the results from both control groups and all event windows), columns 5, 6, and 7 describe the changes that result from using 
different event windows (pooling the results from both control groups and measures of price), columns 8 and 9 describe the changes that result from using a different control group (pooling the results 
from all event windows and measures of price).  
Price Measure Event Window Control GroupTransaction


















7Estimated price effects calculated using monthly price data from 5 regions in IRI's drug store channel data (11/1996 - 2/1999 
excluding 09/1997 – 02/1998).
3Estimated price effects calculated using monthly price data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data (7/1995 - 8/1998 excluding 
11/1996 – 04/1997).
4Estimated price effects calculated using monthly price data from 10 regions in IRI's mass merchandiser data (1/1997 - 12/2000 
excluding 10/1998 – 03/1999).
5Estimated price effects calculated using monthly price data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data (11/1996 - 4/1998 excluding 
4/1997 – 10/1997).




1Estimated coefficient in bold, standard errors in regular font. The calculation of  standard errors assumes negligible covariances 
among the component estimators.
2Aggregate Price Effects are calculated as the (revenue) weighted average of the individual price effects from our preferred 
























Share Brand Dollar Share
Volume 
Share
P&G 25% 24% General Mills 28% 25%
Kimberly Clark 24% 28% Kellogg USA 29% 27% Aunt Jemima 21% 19%
Tambrands 19% 15% Post 19% 19% Log Cabin 19% 18%
J&J 14% 15% Quaker 10% 10% Private Label 19% 28%
Playtex 9% 6% Ralston/Chex 4% 4% Mrs. Butterworth 15% 14%
Other 9% 12% Storebrands 7% 10% Hungry Jack 4% 4%
Other 4% 5% Other 22% 18%
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data








Guinness 24% 21% Pennzoil 29% 27%
Grand Metropolitan 22% 23% Castrol 18% 16%
American Brands, USA 9% 11% Mobil 14% 17%
Seagram Company Ltd, Canada 7% 8% Valvoline 13% 12%
Grant Wm & Sons Ltd, UK 5% 4% Quaker State 9% 8%
Other 33% 34% Havoline 7% 8%
Other 10% 12%
Pancake Syrup Market
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 10 regions in IRI's mass merchandiser channel data. 
1/05/97 - 12/27/98.
Data from 5 regions in IRI's drug store channel data. 10/27/96 - 
12/14/97.
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
7/2/1995 - 1/26/97.
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
10/27/96 - 6/29/97.
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
10/27/96 - 7/20/97.
Motor Oil Market  Liquor Market 
Appendix Table 1: Market Shares
Feminine Protection Market  Cereal Market 1 BALTIMORE/WASHINGTON 1 ALBANY 33 MISSISSIPPI
2 CHICAGO* 2 ATLANTA 34 NASHVILLE
3 DALLAS/FT WORTH 3 BALTIMORE/WASHINGTON DC 35 NEW ENGLAND(NORTH)
4 HOUSTON 4 BIRMINGHAM/MONTGOMERY 36 NEW ORLEANS/MOBILE
5 LOS ANGELES* 5 BOISE 37 NEW YORK (NEW)
6 MINNEAPOLS/ST PAUL 6 BOSTON 38 OKLAHOMA CITY
7 NEW YORK (NEW) 7 BUFFALO/ROCHESTER 39 OMAHA
8 PHOENIX/TUCSON* 8 CHARLOTTE 40 ORLANDO
9 SAN DIEGO* 9 CHICAGO 41 PEORIA/SPRINGFIELD
10 SAN FRANCISCO/OAKLAND* 10 CINCINNATI/DAYTON 42 PHILADELPHIA
11 CLEVELAND 43 PHOENIX/TUCSON
12 COLUMBUS 44 PITTSBURGH
13 DALLAS/FT. WORTH 45 PORTLAND
14 DENVER 46 PROVIDENCE
15 DES MOINES 47 RALEIGH/GREENSBORO
16 DETROIT 48 RICHMOND/NORFOLK
17 GRAND RAPIDS 49 ROANOKE
18 GREEN BAY 50 SACRAMENTO
19 HARRISBURG/SCRANTON 51 SALT LAKE CITY
20 HARTFORD/SPRINGFIELD 52 SAN ANTONIO/CORPUS CHR
21 HOUSTON 53 SAN DIEGO
22 INDIANAPOLIS 54 SAN FRANCISCO/OAKLAND
23 JACKSONVILLE 55 SEATTLE/TACOMA
24 KANSAS CITY 56 SOUTH CAROLINA
25 KNOXVILLE 57 SPOKANE
26 LITTLE ROCK 58 ST. LOUIS
27 LOS ANGELES 59 SYRACUSE
28 LOUISVILLE 60 TAMPA/ST PETERSBURG
29 MEMPHIS 61 TOLEDO
30 MIAMI/FT LAUDERDALE 62
31 MILWAUKEE 63 WEST TEXAS/NEW MEXICO
32 MINNEAPOLIS/ST PAUL 64 WICHITA
*Cities Included in the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan Merger Data
TULSA
MASS MERCHANDISER AND 
DRUGSTORE MARKETS (10) FOOD MARKETS(64)




COEFFICIENT ST ERROR T STAT
PENNZOIL 0.025 0.019 1.344
QUAKER STATE 0.061 0.016 3.922
QUAKER STATE DELUXE 0.038 0.021 1.831
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 10 regions in IRI's mass merchandiser channel data. 
Monthly data from 1/1997 - 1/2001 excluding 10/1998 – 03/1999




COEFFICIENT ST ERROR T STAT
ALWAYS LINER 0.052 0.003 17.179
ALWAYS PAD 0.053 0.003 17.547
TAMPAX TAMPON 0.045 0.004 11.293
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data.
Monthly 11/1996 - 4/1998 excluding 4/1997 – 10/1997




COEFFICIENT ST ERROR T STAT
CHEERIOS 0.051 0.007 7.700
CHEERIOS APPLE CINN 0.060 0.009 7.017
CHEERIOS HONEY NUT 0.024 0.005 4.428
CHEERIOS MULTI-GRAIN 0.037 0.006 6.555
CORN CHEX  0.014 0.010 1.494
MULTI-BRAN CHEX 0.012 0.008 1.412
RICE CHEX  0.015 0.009 1.682
WHEAT CHEX  0.017 0.010 1.742
WHEATIES 0.034 0.009 3.872
WHEATIES CRSP 'N RSN 0.017 0.011 1.490
WHEATIES HONEY FROSTED 0.035 0.008 4.435
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
Monthly data from 7/1995 - 8/1998 excluding 11/1996 – 04/1997Appendix Table 6: Estimated Price Effects for Guinness/Grand Metropolitan Merger
No Control Group
CATEGORY BRAND SUB-BRAND LITERS
MERGE 
COEFFICIENT ST ERROR T STAT
GIN BOOTHS REGULAR 1.75 0.030 0.008 3.819
GIN GILBEYS REGULAR 0.75 0.052 0.008 6.487
GIN GILBEYS REGULAR 1.75 0.003 0.005 0.493
GIN GORDONS REGULAR 0.75 0.007 0.005 1.544
GIN GORDONS REGULAR 1.75 0.016 0.005 3.191
GIN POPOV REGULAR 1.75 0.016 0.028 0.563
GIN TANQUERAY REGULAR 0.75 0.042 0.006 6.667
GIN TANQUERAY REGULAR 1.75 0.075 0.003 25.125
SCOTCH WHISKY J & B J & B RARE 0.75 0.079 0.008 10.017
SCOTCH WHISKY J & B J & B RARE 1.75 0.045 0.011 4.025
SCOTCH WHISKY JOHNNIE WALKER JOHNNIE WALKER BLACK LABEL 0.75 0.053 0.010 5.530
SCOTCH WHISKY JOHNNIE WALKER JOHNNIE WALKER RED LABEL 0.75 0.063 0.007 9.044
SCOTCH WHISKY JOHNNIE WALKER JOHNNIE WALKER RED LABEL 1.75 0.047 0.008 6.232
SCOTCH WHISKY SCORESBY SCORESBY 0.75 0.047 0.006 8.411
SCOTCH WHISKY SCORESBY SCORESBY 1.75 0.037 0.008 4.889
VODKA GILBEYS REGULAR 0.75 -0.005 0.017 -0.287
VODKA GILBEYS REGULAR 1.75 0.032 0.014 2.334
VODKA GORDONS CITRUS 0.75 0.011 0.017 0.628
VODKA GORDONS REGULAR 0.75 0.047 0.006 7.384
VODKA GORDONS CITRUS 1.75 -0.010 0.008 -1.234
VODKA GORDONS REGULAR 1.75 0.006 0.006 1.065
VODKA POPOV REGULAR 0.75 0.038 0.010 3.840
VODKA POPOV REGULAR 1.75 0.025 0.007 3.485
VODKA SMIRNOFF CITRUS 0.75 0.063 0.006 10.025
VODKA SMIRNOFF REGULAR 0.75 0.040 0.011 3.525
VODKA SMIRNOFF CITRUS 1.75 -0.013 0.004 -3.335
VODKA SMIRNOFF REGULAR 1.75 0.002 0.004 0.351
VODKA TANQUERAY REGULAR 0.75 0.029 0.010 2.957
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 5 regions in IRI's drug store channel data. 
Monthly data 11/1996 - 2/1999 excluding 09/1997 – 02/1998




COEFFICIENT ST ERROR T STAT
LOG CABIN 0.027 0.007 3.689
MRS BUTTERWORTH -0.007 0.006 -1.179
Based in part on Information Resources, Inc. data
Data from 64 regions in IRI's food channel data. 
11/1996 - 4/1998 excluding 4/1997 – 10/1997